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Abstract 
Between the end of 1993 and the spring of 1994, about 5000 
Mainland Chinese rejected refugee (MCR) claimants mobilized 
themselves in Canada to lobby the Canadian government to 
make a special policy for them so that they could be considered 
for landed immigration status. The mobiliza tion, launched by 
the Mainland Chinese Refugee Organization (MCRO), won 
wide sympathy and supportfrom the Chinese community and 
mainstream society in Canada. The MCRs stated their goals 
and demands through Chinese ethnic media and mainstream 
media, started a dialogue with the Canadian government and 
even staged a protest in front of the Parliament Buildings in  
Ottawa. O n  Iuly 7,1994, the Minister of Citizenship and Im- 
migration Canada issued a policy, known as the Deferred Re- 
moval Orders Class (DROC) program, designed for claimants 
in similar situations. 
In this paper, we examine the process of the movement, ana- 
lyze its features, and discuss its efects on the Chinese diaspora 
community in Canada. The movement emerged ou t of the 'Ifear" 
of a group of Chinese claimants, caused by the threat of being 
deportedfrom Canada. The success of the movement was based 
on the mobilization of ethnicand social resources by theMCRO. 
Introduction 
We live in a rapidly changing and 
globalized world within which the 
transnational mass movements of 
population have become more popu- 
lar than ever before. As a specific phe- 
nomenon that developed with the 
growth of state hegemony in the 15th 
century, refugee experience is hardly 
new (Domelly and Hopkins 1993, 2). 
In the contemporary world complex 
population movement, refugees are a 
growing element associated with the 
new world order that followed the end 
of Cold War (Richmond 1994, xi). It has 
been an international problem that is 
increasingly challenging concerned 
scholars all over the world since World 
War 11. 
Mainland Chinese Refugee (MCR) 
claimants are by no means a new 
phenomenon in the refugee world; the 
numbers of MCR claimants entering 
North America, particularly Canada, 
substantially increased after the 
Tiananmen Tragedy of June 4, 1989, 
but this is just the latest of a number of 
refugee groups who have entered 
North America historically (Tian et al., 
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1994). Due to Canada's prosperity in 
comparison with China and the per- 
ceived opportunity for a better life, 
more and more MCRs chose Metro 
Toronto as their destination. Accord- 
ing to the statistics released by the Im- 
migration and Refugee Board of 
Canada (IRB), from January, 1984 to 
June, 1993, 8,992 Mainland Chinese 
had made refugee claims in Canada. 
Based on the reports in local Chinese 
newspapers, it is estimated that about 
2,500 MCRs live in Metro Toronto. 
Larger numbers of MCRs coming to 
Canada did not occur until recent 
years, as will be described. The reforms 
and the "open door" policy in China in 
the last two decades has made the Chi- 
nese more exposed to the West than 
ever before. The desire to emigrate far 
exceeds the available resources, result- 
ing in large numbers of illegal emi- 
grants and refugees. Once they have 
left China, these illegal emigrants and 
refugees become members of the di- 
aspora Chinese community or over- 
seas Chinese community, which has 
now reached a total world population 
of 50 million (Fu 1994). In Canada, al- 
though some of them subsequently 
qualify as bonafide refugees according 
to Canadian refugee policies and are 
permitted to stay permanently, most 
of them fail to meet the Geneva 
convention criteria. Some were subse- 
quently allowed to stay inCanada tem- 
porarily under the special order by the 
Minister of Employment and Immi- 
gration Canada in the Summer of 1989 
(Gilad 1990, 314). Up to 1994, there 
were about 4,500 such rejected MCR 
claimants cross Canada (Winnipeg Free 
Press, April 19, 1994, A4). Due to the 
uncertainty of their legal status in 
Canada, they were facing the danger to 
be deported back to China. This fact 
made them realize that they must mo- 
bilize themselves and struggle for their 
legal status collectively. 
Collective Behaviour theory defines 
"fear," "crisis," or "panic" as one of the 
important determinants of collective 
behaviour. According to Strauss: 
The conditions of panic can be 
roughly classified into three catego- 
ries: physiological, psychological, 
and sociological . . . A student seek- 
ing a genuinely effective statement 
of panic causation would attempt to 
find what is essential to these diverse 
conditions and tie these essential 
conditions into a dynamic statement 
of the development and outbreak of 
the panic occurrence. (Strauss 1944, 
324) 
In the case of the MCR movement, the 
notion of "fear" is a psychological one 
and it has had significant impact on the 
emergence of the movement. It is 
"fear" that brought all the Chinese re- 
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jetted refugees together. The move- 
ment started when this group of peo- 
ple shared the same fear or felt 
threatened by the "inevitable expect- 
ancy of danger." As a Chinese saying 
goes: "tong bing xiang lian (fellow suf- 
ferers commiserate with each other)." 
The threat made these people gather 
together and start certain actions in 
order to fight for their common inter- 
ests or safety (not to be deported). 
Here, their shared identity of being "in 
the same boat" was reflected in their 
collective goals: 
We assume that people can and do 
care about collective goals and act on 
them as if they were personal ben- 
efits. We take the goals as subjec- 
tively determined and often linked 
to important elements of people's 
self-identities. This assumption is in 
line with virtually all available em- 
pirical evidence about collective ac- 
tion participants. (Morris and 
Mueller 1992,252) 
Having the same "fear" and "collec- 
tive goals" in mind, Chinese rejected 
refugee claimants started their actions. 
They mobilized support from society 
and organized mass meetings to make 
their situations understood and their 
voices heard, resulting in a protest 
movement led by these rejected MCR 
claimants. 
Mobilization is an important proc- 
ess in any movement. It has a direct 
impact on the outcome of a movement. 
How did they assess the situation, 
what strategies did they make accord- 
ingly, what disadvantages did they 
have and how did they manage to 
overcome them? These are issues fac- 
ing the MCRO's leadership of the 
movement: 
. . . Social networks providing group 
coherence and strong horizontal 
links are key facilitators of collective 
action. These links promote the de- 
velopment of group identity and 
group solidarity. They also foster 
communication and encourage the 
development of organizational skills 
and leadership experience. (Carroll 
1992,40) 
The establishment of the Mainland 
Chinese Refugees Organization 
(MCRO) played a crucial role in this 
movement. It not only provided to the 
Chinese rejected refugees a sense of 
belonging in a foreign society but also 
made the Canadian government and 
society understand this group. 
Resource Mobilization Theory also 
stresses the importance of leadership 
in the social movement. "Leaders iden- 
tify and define grievances, develop a 
sense of groupness, devise strategies, 
and aid mobilization by reducing its 
costs and taking advantages of oppor- 
tunities for collective action" (Carroll 
1992, 40). According to Oliver, there 
are two kinds of technologies; produc- 
tion technologies and mobilization 
technologies (Oliver 1992, 255). Pro- 
duction technologies are sets of knowl- 
edge about ways of achieving goals, 
such as lobbying, demonstrations, 
strikes, or attending a public hearing. 
Mobilization technologies are sets of 
Mobilizing money can take any forms, 
as long as it is raised. Mobilizing time 
involves more strategies, depending 
on who does the mobilization and who 
is mobilized. It requires being willing 
to ask people to do things and know- 
ing something about the people one is 
trying to mobilize. The personal link is 
very important. It also requires asking 
people who are known to be interested 
and can make a contribution to the 
movement. 
Background 
The June 4th Tiananmen Incident in 
China caused strong responses from 
around the world. Canada was one of 
the countries which fiercely protested 
against the incident. The Canadian 
government under Mulroney immedi- 
ately issued an administrative morato- 
rium on removals of the rejected MCRs 
claimants in Canada. 
The June 4th Tiananmen Incident in China caused strong re- 
sponses from around the worM. Canada was one of the countries 
which fiercely protested against the incident. The Canadian govern- 
ment under Mulroney immediately issued an administrative morato- 
rium on removals of the rejected MCRs claimants in Canada. 
knowledge about ways of accumulat- 
ing the resources (such as time and 
money) necessary for production tech- 
nologies. Organization leaders' un- 
derstanding and analysis of the 
situation directly affect their mobiliza- 
tion strategies, thus influencing the 
outcome of the movement. They bal- 
anced the two technologies in a society 
foreign to them. They focused their 
"production technologies" exclusively 
on the Canadian government so that 
more energies could be spent on "mo- 
bilization technologies." 
Time and money as resources are 
the two major components in the 
"mobilization technologies." As 
Oliver states: 
Money is perfectly fungible; it 
doesn't matter from whom it comes 
or in what amounts . . . Time is very 
different . . . It always matters who is 
participating, and a time contribu- 
tion can never be physically removed 
from the giver. (Oliver 1992,257) 
Two implications followed: first, 
these Chinese would be granted 
landed immigrant status in Canada, as 
long as they held a valid visa; second, 
Chinese, who did not hold a valid visa 
in Canada or had illegally entered 
Canada, would not be deported back 
to China. Instead, they would be ah 
lowed to apply for Convention refugee 
status. This policy had a great impact 
on the Chinese in Canada at that time. 
For those who held valid visas, no 
matter whether they were student vi- 
sas, visitor's visas or even a transit vi- 
sas, were all eligible to apply for 
landed immigrant status and often it 
was granted (cf. Liu 1995). All the oth- 
ers who did not hold valid visas, ap- 
plied for conventional refugee status 
(cf. Tian et al. 1994). 
By the end of 1992, there were about 
8000 Chinese conventional refugee 
claimants in Canada, mainly in large 
cities such as Toronto, Montreal, and 
Vancouver. The panel of the Immigra- 
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tion and Refugee Board (IRB) made its 
decision on the basis of its knowledge 
of China and its views on the claim- 
ants' claims, in accordance with the 
Convention on the Status of Refugees. 
Among all the claimants, about 30 per- 
cent of applications were approved; 
while the majority were refused. In 
total, about 5000 Chinese claimants 
were rejected. Rejected claimants sub- 
sequently either appealed to the fed- 
eral court, or applied to stay on 
humanitarian and compassionate 
grounds. 
While the application for refugee 
status was being assessed by IRB, the 
claimant would get a wide range of 
government assistance such as legal 
aid, living allowance, temporary 
medical assistance, employment 
service, free ESL education, occupa- 
tional training, interest-free transpor- 
tation loans and other social assistance. 
It was estimated that the Federal gov- 
ernment would spend up to $50 000 
per refugee claimant in order to com- 
plete the full process. 
The Canadian refugee policy was 
seen as the most generous in the world. 
The perceived "pull" factor might be 
overwhelming. An accepted MCR 
claimant told one of the authors: 
When I managed to escape from 
China after June 4, I went to Austria 
toapply forrefugeestatus. You know 
what, I was put into prison for 
months to wait for a hearing. I basi- 
cally lived with prisoners and was 
badly treated. I couldn't get good 
food and was beaten twice by the 
policemen. My personal belongings 
were stolen . . . Finally, I got help and 
came to Canada. There is no compari- 
son in terms of how the two govem- 
ments treat me as a refugee. I am glad 
that I can live here. I am a Christian 
now. (interview, Dec. 28,1994) 
A rejected MCR said: 
When our group got to Bolivia, we 
really intended to settle there and 
find chances to do some business. 
After a while, we found out that the 
economy was bad in the country and 
there was no money. In the mean- 
time, we were told that it would be 
very easy to get status in Canada. We 
then thought there might be good 
chances there, since Canada is a de- 
veloped country. Therefore, we came 
here and applied for refugee status. 
(interview, Jan. 15,1995) 
As the economy in Canada was ex- 
periencing a severe recession in the 
early 1990s, Canadians had mixed feel- 
ings about the numbers of refugee 
claimants who were "flocking" to the 
country. While many people were 
proud and happy to be able to welcome 
people fleeing persecution from other 
parts of the world, there were also 
strong voices against existing Cana- 
dian refugee policy. Complaints were 
that current refugee policy was taken 
advantage of by people who were not 
genuine refugees; government had 
spent too much of taxpayers' money 
on refugees, and claimants created in- 
stability in society owing to the in- 
crease of the crimes related to refugee 
claimants; there was a clearly negative 
sentiment toward refugee claimants in 
Canada. 
It was in this social climate that a 
group of Chinese refugee claimants 
decided to setup their own organiza- 
tion, which was aimed at uniting all 
Chinese refugee claimants in Canada 
to better express their interests. Their 
intention was to help Chinese refugees 
better adapt to the society, use the or- 
ganization as a means to take care of 
Chinese refugees, solve their common 
problems and, most important of all, to 
create a good image in the society. The 
initial idea of this organization was 
also to create a sense of belonging 
among Chinese refugees. In January 
1992, the Mainland Chinese Refugee 
Organization (MCRO) was estab- 
lished, as anon-profit, and nongovern- 
mental association. 
The MCRO strongly advocated four 
principles: self-respect, self-love, self- 
strengthen (translated from Chinese, 
meaning: to build up confidence) and 
self-establish (translated from Chi- 
nese, it means self-reliance). They edu- 
cated refugee claimants that they did 
have the right to get government wel- 
fare. However, they also taught that 
welfare was a burden on the govern- 
ment and Canadians did not like it. 
Therefore, refugees were advised that 
they should get off welfare as soon as 
they could and try to make contribu- 
tions to the society as taxpayers. The 
organization also strongly discour- 
aged any involvement in crime. It was 
made clear to MCRs that the MCRO 
agreed that deportation was necessary 
for those who committed crimes or cre- 
ated any instability in Canada (Organi- 
zation Charter 1992). 
The MCRO organization was 
widely welcomed by Chinese refugee 
claimants. Letters came from many 
quarters of the country to support the 
organization. For example, a letter 
from Montreal reads: 
In the situation of being discrimi- 
nated against and attacked by the 
local media and "noted persons," it is 
absolutely necessary and significant 
for Chinese refugee claimants to 
have an organization of their own. 
Please receive my sincere respect to 
the organizers and leaders of the or- 
ganization. We hope the organiza- 
tion will help us gain understanding 
from Canadian people. (letter, Dec., 
1992, translated from Chinese) 
The Movement 
Toward the end of 1993 and early 1994, 
the issue of Chinese rejected refugee 
claimants became critical. Most of the 
Chinese refugee applications were 
turned down and the new government 
(Liberal) started to reconsider the ad- 
ministrative moratorium on removals 
of rejected Chinese claimants. Both 
Chinese and English media were re- 
porting the relevant information and 
implied that deportation of Mainland 
Chinese rejected refugee claimants 
was possible. 
The Toronto Star reported that: 
Immigration Minister Sergio Marchi 
says that he has ruled out the idea of 
an amnesty for 4500 rejected Chinese 
refugee claimants who have been al- 
lowed to stay in Canada since the 
1989 Tiananmen massacre. The ban 
on deportation to China is now being 
reviewed by the immigration depart- 
ment. (The Toronto Star, March 25,1994) 
The Toronto S u n  read: 
Marchi refused to say what the gov- 
ernment intends to do, but noted that 
-- -- 
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other countries have returned Chi- 
nese who claimed refugee status af- 
ter Tiananmen Square. "People have 
been sending the Chinese failed refu- 
gee applications from around the 
world back to China," he told report- 
ers. (The Toronto Sun, March 23,1994) 
The Shin Tao Daily read: 
Critics say that (Canadian) govern- 
ment has sacrificed the interests of 
this group of Chinese (rejected refu- 
gee claimants) for the benefit of poli- 
tics. Primeminister Jean Chretian has 
planned to visit China in the coming 
fall. 
A special group from the Immigra- 
tion ministry is contacting the Chi- 
nese embassy in Ottawa, discussing 
the issue of sending Chinese rejected 
refugee claimants back to China . . . 
Marchi said that (human rights) situ- 
ation in China has improved. "My 
colleague, (director of Asia and Pa- 
cific department, Foreign Affairs) 
Chen Zhuoyu, a major promoter for 
democracy in China, admitted that 
the situation in China had im- 
proved." (Shin Tao Daily, March 23, 
1994, translated from Chinese) 
Ming Pao Daily read: 
Mr. Roger White, the spokesperson 
of immigration minister, Marchi, 
said that according to the immigra- 
tion and refugee board, the 4500 Chi- 
nese are not refugees. "There is not 
enough evidence that they will be 
persecuted." (Ming Pao Daily, March 
14,1994, translated from Chinese) 
Reports from the media had tremen- 
dous impact on Mainland Chinese re- 
jected refugee claimants. The fear of 
being deported back to China soon 
spread widely among them, particu- 
larly by April of 1994, when they re- 
ceived the "removal order" from 
Ministry of Immigration and Employ- 
ment. 
This fear served as the basic motiva- 
tion for the later protest movement. As 
noted above, the commonly shared 
"fear" drew them closer to the MCRO 
organization, thus making the mobili- 
zation possible. 
The MCRO committees carefully 
examined the situation of these re- 
jected MCR claimants. On the one 
hand, it was found that most of them 
had already stayed in Canada for 3-4 
years. Some got married, remarried or 
had babies born here. However, they 
were in "limbo," hoping one day their 
immigration status would be granted. 
On the other hand, they did fear being 
deported. They knew that the govern- 
ment of the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) would not react favourably to 
the Chinese who have been recognized 
by foreign countries as refugees or who 
have applied to be recognized as such. 
The claim of refugee status by any citi- 
zen of the PRC outside the country 
might be treated as traitorous behav- 
iour. Once a person is so labelled, he or 
she might be subjected to a series of 
visible or invisible persecution, and it 
would be difficult for him or her to re- 
turn to conventional life. Moreover, his 
or her relatives might be negatively 
affected (Tian 1995). The MCRO lead- 
ers analyzed the situation from the fol- 
lowing aspects: 
The Economic Conditions: Canada has 
been experiencing economic recession 
for four years continuously. The un- 
employment rate had reached a his- 
torical height. The Liberal Party in 
power could hardly change the situa- 
tion in a short time, owing to the im- 
pact of the recession in the whole 
western world. 
The Social Climate: Because of the eco- 
nomic recession, there was a strong 
anti-immigrant voice in the society. 
Many thought that new immigrants 
had taken Canadian people's jobs. 
Refugees created social instability. 
They committed crimes, robberies, 
shooting police officers, etc. The senti- 
ment against immigrants in the society 
was obvious, let alone against rejected 
refugee claimants 
The Political Climate: The Reform Party 
was strongly criticizing the existing 
refugee policy. It complained that the 
government had been too generous to 
refugee claimants. Too much of tax- 
payer's money had been wasted on 
refugees, in terms of welfare, medical 
care, free language/job training, etc. 
The Situation in  China: The economy in 
China was booming. The western 
world was strongly attracted by the 
huge market in China in the hope that 
through the Chinese market, recession 
could be brought to an end. Moreover, 
as China became more open, the Chi- 
nese government started to release 
some of the political prisoners in order 
to better its image. It also loosened the 
regulations to let people get out of 
China. 
These factors might have led to 
some misconceptions among Canadi- 
ans that there would be no dangers for 
the rejected refugee claimants to return 
to China. Besides, it is possible that the 
Canadian government would try to 
please the Chinese government by sac- 
rificing the interest of this group of re- 
jected refugee claimants in order to 
gain a strong foothold in the expand- 
ing Chinese market (interviewed on 
Feb. 10,1995). 
Hence, the MCRO decided to make 
the following responses: 
First, they wrote a long report to the 
government, comprehensively analys- 
ing the actual situation of the 4,500 
Chinese rejected refugee claimants. By 
giving the government a full picture of 
these people, they wanted the govern- 
ment as well as the society to under- 
stand that the Chinese rejected refugee 
claimants were not a burden to Cana- 
dian society. MCRO found that most of 
them had been off welfare a long time 
and had made contributions to the so- 
ciety. It recommended that the govern- 
ment consider a special policy to grant 
the group of Chinese landed immi- 
grant status onhumanitarianand com- 
passionate grounds. 
Secondly, they mobilized support to 
win sympathy from all parts of the so- 
ciety: Chinese community, main- 
stream society, media, churches, and 
politicians. The MCRO also strongly 
advocated to its members to abide by 
Canadian constitutions and laws, to 
respect different cultures and to estab- 
lish themselves. It reasserted the four 
principles so as to create and project a 
positive/desirable image of them- 
selves in the society. 
Taking into consideration the nu- 
ances as presented, the MCRO decided 
to choose the Canadian government as 
the sole object for their "production 
technologies," and based their mobili- 
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zation on presenting their case. In the 
meantime, they spent more energies 
on "mobilization technologies," cover- 
ing communities, media, influential 
persons. 
As the MCRO implemented its plan, 
a financial shortage appeared. Al- 
though the organization charged a five 
dollar membership fee (most of them 
voluntarily paid much more), it was 
unlikely that MCRO could carry out a 
research report on the characteristics 
of the MCRs with its limited funds. 
They applied to various funding agen- 
cies such as the United Way, Metro 
Toronto government, Provincial gov- 
ernment and even the Federal govern- 
ment. None of their applications were 
successful. The committee decided to 
raise funds among its own members. 
The MCRO charged $500 per person 
(compared to an average fee of $1,200 
that was being charged by inexpensive 
lawyers) from two hundred of its 
members and promised in turn to sort 
out their documentation, prepare 
them in prescribed form and then 
present them to the immigration de- 
partment. They hoped that the 200 
typical cases would be treated collec- 
tively, and landed immigration status 
could be granted to them first. The 
committee hired lawyers, immigration 
consultants and translators to prepare 
the 200 cases. 
In the meantime, it started the re- 
search and circulated questionnaires 
for rejected refugee claimants to an- 
swer. However, MCRO confronted 
one of the most difficult problems re- 
lating to the prevailing "biases" 
against MCRs from within the Chinese 
Community. As one of the MCRO's 
leaders said: 
Strong discrimination first came 
fromwithin the Chinese community. 
According to Mainland Chinese im- 
migrants, the very fact that Chinese 
refugee claimants applying for refu- 
gee status had made Chinese people 
lose face in foreign countries. They 
thought that these people took ad- 
vantage of the Canadian refugee 
policy and got too muchbenefit from 
it. They also worried that the refugee 
problem could make the Canadian 
government tighten its rules to let 
immigrants' relatives come to 
Canada, especially at the time when 
there was a strong social sentiment 
against immigrants and there was 
the stereotype that refugee claimants 
had cost too much of taxpayers' 
money and they committed lots of 
crimes. 
Some Chinese who came from Hong 
Kong and Taiwan were opposed to 
assisting refugee claimants. They were 
proud of themselves for coming from 
capitalist or semi-capitalist systems. 
They thought any one coming from 
Mainland China had been brain- 
washed. In their eyes, Mainland Chi- 
nese were potential radicals and, 
therefore, they were not suitable to the 
capitalist system. As to the Chinese 
rejected refugee claimants, they were 
horrible. Their various illegal ways of 
entering Canada reminded them of 
"Red Guards", of Cultural Revolution 
in China. Certainly, the stereotype in 
media also reinforced their impres- 
sion. 
Canadian people usually didn't dis- 
tinguish Chinese refugee claimants 
from other refugee claimants. They 
looked upon them as a whole. There- 
fore, any of their complaints about 
refugee claimants would have a 
negative impact on this Chinese 
group. (interview, Feb. 20,1955) 
In the Chinese community, MCRO 
was discriminated against in many 
ways. They were not allowed to par- 
ticipate in any activities with other or- 
ganizations, even if they offered funds. 
MCRO members could only attain the 
most menial work in Chinatown. Em- 
ployers gave them cash-payment, 
which was usually lower than the legal 
minimum pay. Chinese refugee claim- 
ants were in a "take it or leave it" situ- 
ation. They knew they could not find 
jobs in mainstream society because of 
their limited command of English; on 
the other hand, if they complained 
about the employers in China Town, 
they would not get jobs. Therefore, 
they had to endure all the hardships. 
In order to change people's impres- 
sion toward Chinese refugee claim- 
ants, the MCRO adopted the following 
strategies: 
1. They went to churches and talked 
to the pastors where church people 
offered them sympathy, food and 
even places where the MCRO could 
hold meetings. The committee of- 
ten arranged lectures and work- 
shops for its members. Lawyers 
and-legal advisors were invited to 
introduce immigration and refugee 
affairs and legal issues. The "four 
principles" were emphasized re- 
peatedly in order to improve the 
public image of Mainland Chinese 
refugee claimants. News reporters 
and iournalists were also invited to 
attend meetings and lectures. 
2. They contacted influential overseas 
Chinese leaders to solicit help. 
Among them, Mr.   on^  hi-zhong, 
vice chair of Metro-Toronto's Na- 
tional Day Committee and chair of 
Refugee Information Centre, com- 
mented as follows: 
Chinese refugee claimants ac- 
counted for onlv 5% of the whole 
refugee population in Canada. It is 
very wrong to think that Chinese 
refugees have disgraced Chinese 
people. When my grandfather went 
to Philippine, his situation was much 
worse than the refugees today. How- 
ever, the local Chinese there wel- 
comed people like him. Two 
generations later, we are all very suc- 
cessful. M~ father was successful too. 
We are all Chinese and we should 
help each other. In my eyes, refugees 
are just like immigrants, only of dif- 
ferent kind. They should be re- 
spected and receiving help. I have 
noticed that people scold and dis- 
criminate against Chinese refugees. 
This is not acceptable. It is against the 
policy and the interest of Canada. 
Our country always welcomes refu- 
gees coming here to start their new 
lives. We have this reputation in the 
world . . . Chinese people are most 
hard-working and understanding. 
Every one can see that most of the 
Chinese refugee claimants have got 
off welfare and established them- 
selves. Lots of refugees are doing the 
most menial work, overtime and get- 
ting low pay.. . The leaders of MCRO 
are all very respectable ... I am very 
impressed by the four-self principles 
(sic) the MCRO advocates. I think 
this is a big contribution the MCRO 
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has made to the Canadian society. I 
noticed that since the four-self prin- 
ciples (sic) were advocated, the 
number of refugee claimants on wel- 
fare has decreased by 5-6 percent. 
(interview, Feb. 15,1995) 
In addition to mobilizing support in 
the Chinese community, the MCRO 
also organized its members to do vol- 
untary work for the members of parlia- 
ment. They made phone calls for the 
Members of parliament to Chinese- 
speaking people and helped the MP's 
in elections in the Chinese community. 
As to the government, the MCRO sent 
letters to express their concerns and 
met with Immigration Department 
officials.After one year's effort, the 
MCRO's mobilization work altered the 
once negative public impression of 
Chinese rejected refugee claimants, 
and the major research project regard- 
ing MCRs was completed. In January. 
bate over this issue. The Parliamentary 
Secretary promised that the Ministry 
of Citizenship and Immigration would 
comprehensively consider the whole 
issue in its deliberations. The protest 
was also widely supported and won 
sympathy and letters of support both 
from the Chinese community and from 
prominent figures in mainstream soci- 
ety. 
Achievement 
The Canadian Immigration Minister 
issued a new policy that affected this 
group of rejected refugee (Chinese) 
claimants, as well as those from other 
countries who were in similar situa- 
tion, on July 7,1994. According to the 
new policy known as the Deferred Re- 
moval Orders Class (DROC) the re- 
jected refugee claimants would get a 
second chance to apply as long as they 
had stayed in Canada for three years, 
Some Chinese who came from Hong Kong and Taiwan were 
opposed to assisting refugee claimants. They were proud of 
themselves for coming from capitalist or semi-capitalist systems. 
. . .. In their eyes, Mainland Chinese were potential radicals and, 
therefore, they were not suitable to the capitalist system. 
1994, the MCRO leaders visited Ot- 
tawa and sent copies of their report 
with over one hundred supporting let- 
ters from organizations to the Immi- 
gration Minister and the Prime 
Minister. 
The Protest 
By April 1994, no response had been 
received. In the meantime, fear of be- 
ing deported back to China among 
MCRs became stronger. The MCRO 
organized a protest at the Ottawa Par- 
liament Buildings on April 18, 1994, 
the day Chinese Vice-premier Zhou 
Jiahua visited Ottawa. During the pro- 
test, many representatives from differ- 
ent organizations participated and 
aired their support in addition to 
Mainland Chinese refugee claimants 
from Toronto, Vancouver, and Mon- 
treal. After the protest, seven repre- 
sentatives of the protesters were 
invited to Parliament to hear the de- 
had been paying tax for over half a year 
and had not committed any crimes in 
Canada. 
Despite some other specific prob- 
lems, the policy was widely welcomed 
by the 4,500 rejected Chinese claimants 
as well as the Chinese community. The 
MCRO decided that the policy basi- 
cally met their original goal and ex- 
pressed satisfaction over the 
government's response to their work. 
The policy served to end the limbo 
status of rejected refugee claimants on 
humanitarian and compassionate 
grounds. Community leaders ap- 
plauded MCRO's efforts. The Immi- 
gration Ministry recognized MCRO's 
work, especially the research report. 
With this new policy, the fear of being 
deported for many of these rejected 
MCR claimants no longer existed. The 
mainland Chinese rejected refugee 
claimants' movement gradually came 
to an end. 
Conclusion 
MCRs' mobilization of social accept- 
ance and legal status in Canada is a 
very successful ethnopolitical mobili- 
zation. Ethnic political mobilization 
constructed by Adam (1984), Nagata 
(1981), ,01zak (1983), and Zenner 
(1988), explains clearly how MCRO 
could take common interests as the 
keynote around which to organize 
MCRs, and took ethnicity as the base 
through which to persuade the Chi- 
nese communities to support them in 
pursuit of collective benefits. Ethnicity 
played a role as "a potential for action 
and mobility" (Nagata 1981,89). How- 
ever, it must be pointed out that in this 
case, because of sub-ethnic conflicts 
(Tian 1995, 1993), mobilization engi- 
neered by MCRO had to extend re- 
sources beyond ethnicity to acquire 
political strength. 
According to Gladney (1991), a 
group's identity and loyalty only be- 
come valued "in dialogical interaction 
with sociopolitical context. Just as the 
Self is often defined in terms of the 
other, so ethnic groups coalesce in the 
context of relation and opposition" 
(ibid. 76-77). He stresses that social 
relations of power is the focus of atten- 
tion in a dialogical approach to ethnic- 
ity (ibid.). Following Gladney, the 
MCR dialogue with Chinese commu- 
nities and with government played a 
crucial role in their mobilization. Dia- 
logue appeared an effective strategy in 
their adaptation to the Canadian soci- 
ety at the collective level (Tian 1995). 
A wide variety of factors influences 
the success of an ethnic political mobi- 
lization. Two major factors should be 
stressed; the fear among MCRs and the 
role of the MCRO. The former was 
important as a determinant to initiate 
the movement; the latter brought the 
movement to a success. Leaders of 
MCRO showed their ability to organ- 
ize and mobilize. They made a strate- 
gic decision to closely contact the 
government and keep it informed of 
MCRs' situations. As well, they were 
successful in mobilizing supports from 
social groups and important social per- 
sons (Oliver's theory of "mobilizing 
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time"). As to "mobilizing money," 
MCRO leaders realized the difficulties 
for them in a foreign society. Fortu- 
nately, they were able to solve the 
problem within the organization. The 
MCRO successfully made the voice of 
rejected Chinese refugee claimants 
heard in the larger society and success- 
fully influenced the Canadian govern- 
ment to make a policy favourable to 
them. 
Finally, it is important to point out 
that the success of the mainland Chi- 
nese rejected refugee claimants in per- 
suading the Canadian Government to 
allow them to apply for landing is re- 
lated to the MCRO's mobilization 
strategy, which was politically sensi- 
tive. In the context of Canada's at- 
tempts to secure "economic interest" 
in China, MCRO did not raise the issue 
of "human rights" in China. It sug- 
gested to the Canadian government 
that accepting these rejected refugee 
claimants would merely a humanitar- 
ian act rather than a statement on Chi- 
na's human rights. It argued that 
China's "face" with respect to her hu- 
man rights was not challenged by ac- 
cepting these rejected refugee 
claimants, nor it would have any im- 
pact on Canada's pursuit of its "eco- 
nomic interest in China" (see Tian 1995 
for a detailed discussion). This ration- 
alization fitted well with China's claim 
that "human rights" issues and "eco- 
nomic interests" should not be linked 
between trading nations w 
Notes 
1. Initial work on this paper waspresented by 
the authors at the Fourth Canadian Sympo- 
sium on China at University of Toronto, 
Sept. 22-25, 1995. Authors gratefully ac- 
knowledge the critical review of this paper 
by Professor Lawrence Lam, Department 
of Sociology, York University. 
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Processing Period: Third Quarter (Q3), JulySeptember 1995, and Year-to-Date (YTD) JanuarySeptember 1995 
By Processing Regions 
Claims Heard to Other Claims Decisions Decisions Decisions Claims 
Referred Completion Finalized Positive Negative Pending Pending 
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By Major Source Countries 
Claims Heard to Other Claims Decisions Decisions Decisions Claims 
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